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IS EFFICIENT GOVERNMENT
AN OXYMORON?
PAUL R. VERKUILt
INTRODUCTION
One of the public sector's most enduring dilemmas is how to
improve the performance of government without jeopardizing the
nature of the political structure. This quandary assumes more
urgent dimensions at a time when the private sector has made
stunning efficiency gains. In the last ten years, American business
has reengineered itself to regain the competitive edge that many
assumed had been lost permanently to Japanese and German
industrial enterprises. Today, American workers are the most pro-
ductive in the world.' Although corporate downsizing inevitably
has caused some dislocations, the output of American workers
continues to grow impressively and the level of employment has
stabilized.2 American companies are again world-class producers
of critical goods like computer chips, communications technology,
and even automobiles.' This success virtually compels a compari-
son between the productivity of the public and private sectors.
American government has had the opportunity to track these
productivity gains in the corporate sector and initiate changes in
management structure to achieve comparable gains. Yet despite
rhetoric suggesting otherwise,4 the evidence of government action
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1. See Sylvia Nasar, The American Economy, Back on Top, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27.
1994, § 3, at 1; see also Productivity Up by 4.2% in the Last Quarter of '93, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 9, 1994, at D2.
2. See Nasar, supra note 1.
3. The Japanese now are referring to the United States respectfully as "Rising
Sam" because of its remarkable industrial turnaround. See T.R. Reid, "Rising Sun" Meets
"Rising Sam," WASH. PosT, Feb. 10, 1994, at Al.
4. See Christopher Farrell et al., Rudy Revs up the Chainsaw, BUS. WK., Feb. 21.
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is not reassuring. The U.S. Postal Service, which is supposed to
emulate the productivity standards of private enterprise, has had
few productivity gains over the last twenty years.5 Government
employment at all levels has remained steady at about 18% of the
workforce over the same period, while private sector employment
per firm has declined significantly.6 Recently, for the first time,
the number of workers in local, state, and federal government
(about 18 million) surpassed those in manufacturing,7 which is an
embarrassing statistic. The number of civilian workers in the feder-
al government has remained steady at almost 3% of the
workforce, about twice the ratio in Japan and Germany,8 coun-
tries with similar social systems that are America's main competi-
tors.
In light of this seemingly embedded employment ratio, can
constructive critics offer any hope for the improvement of produc-
tivity in the public sector? President Clinton obviously thought so
when he incorporated "reinventing government" into his campaign
platform,9 and when he instructed Vice President Gore to fulfill
1994, at 42 (describing New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani's proposal to reduce the city
government's workforce by 15,000).
5. An inside study of the Postal Service indicates that "postal productivity peaked
in 1978, showing a cumulative 8% increase, and generally has declined with some fluctua-
tions since that time." POSTAL RATE COMM'N STAFF, STUDY OF U.S. POSTAL SERVICE
PRODUCTIVITY AND ITS MEASUREMENT iii (1990).
6. Of course, government workers could argue that they have assumed new duties
in the last 20 years that could affect their productivity. This argument surely arises in the
Department of Education, where staffing has not kept pace with new student financial
aid programs. But the irony is that this problem has allegedly resulted in the loss of bil-
lions of dollars in defaulted loans. See Michael Winerip, In Managing Federal Money,
Education Officials Fall Short, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1994, at Al. Generally, turnover in
government is slow. In the federal government, the turnover rate is 1% to 2% annually,
whereas many major private corporations recently have reduced their workforces by hun-
dreds of thousands. President Clinton has committed to reducing the federal civilian, non-
postal workforce by 12% (250,000 workers) over the next five years. See AL GORE, THE
NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, CREATING A GOVERNMENT THAT WORKS BETTER &
COSTS LESS iii (1993) [hereinafter NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW].
7. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, EMPLOY-
MENT AND EARNINGS 59 (Aug. 1992). See generally Paul R. Verkuil, Reverse Yardstick
Competition: A New Deal for the Nineties, 45 U. FLA. L. REV. 1, 10 (1993) (arguing that
the federal government must "right-siz[e]" its bloated bureaucracy).
8. Martin Schram, How About a Musical Chairs Cabinet?, NEWSDAY, Oct. 1, 1992,
at 94.
9. In his inaugural address, President Clinton spoke of having the courage to "rein-
vent America." USA TODAY, Jan. 21, 1993, at IA. The reinventing government theme is
now well entrenched. See infra notes 35-36 and accompanying text. In the National Per-
formance Review; President Clinton announced his intentions "to redesign, to reinvent,
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that promise by conducting a National Performance Review
(NPR)."0 This Comment critiques the NPR Report and an accom-
panying document, Improving Regulatory Systems." The over-
riding purpose of the NPR is to create a government that is more
efficient or, in the words of the report, that "works better and
costs less.""2 Many American businesses have met this challenge.
It remains to be seen whether the federal government can emulate
their successes.
I. THE NPR IN CONTEXT
The regulatory systems report was prepared by Jeffrey Lub-
bers, Research Director of the Administrative Conference of the
United States (ACUS), and five career agency employees." Time
constraints limited the amount of research and the level of innova-
tion that the group pursued, but the project resulted in ten co-
gently presented recommendations to improve the regulatory pro-
cess. These recommendations borrow from prior reports1 4 and
from executive initiatives, including, not surprisingly, several from
the Carter administration. 5 Every report borrows from other
sources, and there is certainly nothing wrong with referring to the
work of the Carter administration, even from a nonpartisan per-
spective. By embracing deregulatibn, the Carter administration im-
[and] to reinvigorate the entire national government." NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW,
supra note 6, at 1.
10. NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, supra note 6.
11. See OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT, ACCOMPANYING REPORT OF THE NATION-
AL PERFORMANCE REVIEW: IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS [hereinafter IMPROVING
REGULATORY SYSTEMS].
12. NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, supra note 6, at i.
13. See Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Better Regulations: The National Performance Review's
Regulatory Reform Recommendations, 43 DUKE L.J. 1165, 1165 nt (1994).
14. See, e.g., id. at 1168-69 (noting that the regulatory systems report borrowed
heavily from the CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND GOVERNMENT,
RISK AND THE ENVIRONMENT' IMPROVING REGULATORY DECISION MAKING (1993)).
The chairman of the report, Douglas Costle, was head of the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) under President Carter and chairman of the Regulatory Council.
15. For example, the proposed Interagency Regulatory Coordinating Group draws its
inspiration from President Carter's Regulatory Council. See IMPROVING REGULATORY
SYSTEMS. supra note 11, at 17-22. Its purpose is laudatory-to get agencies to work
together. Failure to do so is a principal reason that government cannot improve its effi-
ciency. President Clinton has incorporated the regulatory working group into the role of
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in monitoring agency regulations. See
Exec. Order No. 12,866. 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51.739 (1993).
1224 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 43:1221
plemented the concept of efficiency in government. Indeed, that
administration's deregulation and regulatory review efforts were
accepted and extended by the Reagan and Bush administra-
tions. 6
The current administration prefers to reform rather than to
reduce government and to de-emphasize deregulation. Yet it is
difficult to incorporate efficiency standards into existing regulations
without relying on deregulation. 7 One of the virtues of deregu-
lation is the ease of assessing results; many of the costs govern-
ment regulation imposes on the private sector can be quantified,
and when deregulation occurs, there are ways to measure the
benefits.'" Unfortunately, the administration apparently has disre-
garded the importance of measuring the results of its programs.
Measuring the benefits of improvements in government per-
formance is necessary, though. In this regard, the regulatory sys-
tems report is deficient. As the corporate world has learned, mea-
surement is the key to performance. Efficiency cannot be sus-
tained without an effort to quantify improvements. Whether for
lack of time or lack of consensus, the regulatory systems team
16. See Geoffrey P. Miller, From Compromise to Confrontation: Separation of Powers
in the Reagan Era, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 401, 411 (1989); GLEN 0. ROBINSON,
AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY: PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 107-08 (1991) (discussing
problems in the Reagan administration's deregulation efforts).
17. Deregulation is efficient in two ways: It frees industries to compete. and it re-
duces the number of government agencies. One example is the airline industry, in which
deregulation led to increased competition and the demise of the Civil Aeronautics Board.
Another is AT&T, the breakup of which created entirely new players in the communica-
tions field and succeeded in improving efficiency. The NPR Report does not mention
deregulation, but it does advocate the use of government corporations in some areas
(e.g., Federal Aviation Administration airport control). See NATIONAL PERFORMANCE RE-
VIEW, supra note 6, at 60-61. Whether that method is better than the pure free market
alternative of deregulation is questionable. See Verkuil, supra note 7, at 3-5.
18. See, e.g., Roger F. Naill & Sharon Belanger, Impacts of Deregulation on U.S.
Electric Utilities, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Oct. 12, 1989, at 24 (modelling the potential benefits
of alternative proposals for electrical utility deregulation); see also Robert W. Hahn &
John A. Hird, The Costs and Benefits of Regulation: Review and Synthesis. 8 YALE J. ON
REG. 233 (1991) (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of various methods of
quantifying the impacts of regulation and stressing the importance of such quantification).
Admittedly, however, debates continue over the extent of the benefits of competi-
tion in industries such as transportation and telecommunications. See Robert M.
Hardaway, Transportation Deregulation (1976-1984): Turning the Tide, 14 TRANSl. L.J.
101, 102-07 (1984) (discussing the "Great Deregulation Debate" with regard to the trans-
portation industry); Emerging Competitive Forces in International Communications: Satel-
lites and Cables, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 235, 248 (1985) (panel discussion) (observing that
complicated issues regarding competition in the satellite communications industry arise in
both the domestic and international contexts).
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failed to determine how to measure the benefits of its recommen-
dations. Clearly, the benefits are measurable, but, ironically, the
only benefit quantified in the report involves the transfer of law-
yer training courses back to Washington. 9 Surely, the only rec-
ommendation that explicitly calls for savings should not be one in-
volving lawyers.
Measurement techniques are available for at least some of the
other recommendations. For example, those related to streamlining
the rulemaking process 0 ought to yield estimates of savings
based on the time spent by the parties involved and the timeliness
of the rules that result. It is also possible to compare the cost and
time savings of regulatory negotiation ("reg neg")2" with those of
"contested" rulemaking, including the implicit costs of judicial
review. Admittedly, these numbers would be soft, but they would
be more persuasive than no numbers at all. We live, after all, in
an era of regulatory impact statements mandated by Congress and
the Office of" Management and Budget (OMB). If the value of
lives can be quantified, then so can the savings in decisionmaking
due to regulatory negotiation.
Moreover, other sections of the NPR Report have asserted
high potential savings. For example, the report states that $4 bil-
lion can be saved by improving the Social Security Administration
(SSA) disability process?' As one who has studied the SSA dis-
ability hearing process,' I am doubtful that a consensus can be
built around a streamlining of that process. By claiming such a
high potential savings, though, the reform effort may get the at-
tention it needs. Similarly, an attempt to quantify the benefits of
streamlined rulemaking might build support for the legislative and
19. The Justice Department has been required by statute to site legal education for
government lawyers in Columbia, South Carolina. Merely returning this function to Wash-
ington would save $1.6 million annually in travel and per diem costs. Interestingly, the
regulatory systems report does not even recommend that this small amount be used to
reduce the costs of government. Rather, it suggests that the savings be used to train non-
lawyers. See IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS, supra note 11, at 69-72.
20. See id. at 41-46.
21. Id. at 29-32.
22. This recommendation seeks to save $4 billion by applying the "resources and
management tools needed to reduce backlogs and to avoid paying benefits to individuals
who are no longer disabled." NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, supra note 6, app. A
at 141. These goals are worthy, undoubtedly, but hard to achieve.
23. See JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS
(1978).
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agency changes necessary for such reform. Perhaps the best way to
proceed at this stage is for the NPR staff, with assistance from the
regulatory systems team, or even the ACUS, to undertake the
quantification effort as a follow-up study, especially in areas in
which Congress will be asked to implement change.
The regulatory systems report also suggests important regu-
latory alternatives that are susceptible to quantification. The rank-
ing of risks, through improved risk analysis (listed as "REG07" in
the report),24 and improvements in the use of regulatory science
(REG08) s are vital steps towards making regulations concerning
safety and the environment more cost-effective. Moreover, by
encouraging more innovative approaches to regulation (REG02),26
the report reveals its sensitivity to the costs government imposes
on the private sector. Command and control regulations often
waste government and private resources. In almost every case,
government-supervised, market-based initiatives can deliver more
at less cost.27
II. POLITICS AND THE CORPORATE-GOVERNMENT ANALOGY
The regulatory systems report's last sections address improving
agency/Congress relationships (REG09)2" and providing better
incentives and training for regulators (REG10)." It is difficult to
argue with these goals, and the report treats them as almost af-
terthoughts. The rest of this Comment explores the assumptions of
these sections, because within them lies the key to answering the
only question that matters: Can government be made more effi-
cient?
24. IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS, supra note 11, at 53-57.
25. Id. at 59-63.
26. Id. at 23-28.
27. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Consensus Versus Incentives: A Skeptical Look at
Regulatory Negotiation, 43 DUKE LJ. 1206, 1212-16 (noting the advantages of incentive
systems in regulation). Oddly, the report seems to justify command and control in certain
cases "where risks that would result from noncompliance are high, as in the regulation of
nuclear power." IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS, supra note 11, at 24. Given that the
potential danger to the public in areas that the EPA regulates can be far greater than
that from nuclear power that is regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, it
makes little sense to single out nuclear power for command and control regulations while
leaving other sources of power, such as coal, free to be regulated by market alternatives.
28. IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS, supra note 11, at 65-68.
29. Id. at 69-73.
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It is conceivable that government is indeed institutionally
impervious to reform. Support for this hypothesis comes from
several quarters, including those who decry the organizational
paralysis that the political system of separation of powers and
federalism produces30 and the public choice school that predicts
how bureaucrats and members of Congress will behave.3 These
sources argue reasonably that people get the government they
deserve and that efficiency reform is beyond our society's capabili-
ties.
These arguments are not completely sound. At least two. fac-
tors suggest that internally driven reform can work in government.
First, the deregulation movement itself is evidence of the potential
for self-correction. If regulation is good for those who propose and
administer it, how does deregulation take hold? It is possible that
the bipartisan congressional and executive combination of altruism
and good sense that led to airline, motor carrier, railroad, and
energy deregulation could be mustered again toward the more
general goal of government efficiency. Second, American business-
es, even monolithic and internally focused organizations like Ford
and IBM, are reforming themselves through quality management.
They, like Xerox,32 were targeted for oblivion by foreign compe-
tition and have come back from the dead. Why can govern-
ment-at all levels, but especially at the federal level-not do the
same?
One obvious answer is that government is not private enter-
prise. When a corporation is failing, it gets clear signals from the
market. Recent successful corporate turnarounds have been found-
ed on reaction to these signals by management and boards of
directors. CEOs in this environment are no longer sacrosanct, as
the former CEOs of Westinghouse, Kodak, and IBM can testify.33
They are increasingly challenged by their boards, and boards are
30. See, e.g.: Lloyd N. Cutler, To Form a Government, in SEPARATION OF POW-
ERS-DOES IT STILL WORK? 1 (Robert A. Goldwin & Art Kaufman eds., 1986) (arguing
that the original justifications for the separation of powers are no longer valid).
31. See generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF
CONSENT (1962) (arguing that the structure of government reflects the rational economic
choices of individual constituents).
32. See DAVID T. KEARNS & DAVID A. NADLER, PROPHETS IN THE DARK: How
XEROX REINVENTED ITSELF AND BEAT BACK THE JAPANESE (1992) (chronicling how
the company reinvented itself by emphasizing quality).
33. See Bigger They Are, Harder They Fall: '93 Tough Year For Executives, CLEVE-
LAND PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 2, 1994, at El.
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in turn challenged by more active stockholders, especially pension
funds. Government, on the other hand, does not receive market
signals when it is failing,34 and it has no CEO or board to make
firm decisions. There are close enough resemblances, though, to
make it possible to view government from a business perspective.
Although government cannot fail in the corporate sense, its
performance certainly can be measured. The cost-plus mentality of
expanding the functions of government without regard to budgets
is a thing of the past. Some state governments are taking inno-
vative steps to measure the performance of government programs.
In Oregon, for example, citizens measure programs against na-
tional benchmarks. States generally have been making innova-
tive market-oriented decisions that have been labelled "reinventing
government. '3 6 Moreover, not-for-profit corporations, which do
not have traditional bottom-line concerns, also are developing
creative ways to measure performance.37 One of the most suc-
cessful companies in the insurance field, for example, is USAA, a
not-for-profit corporation. The American Automobile Association
(AAA) also is not-for-profit, but it has been working to develop
new ways to measure performance that emulate the market of for-
profit competitors. By adopting a concept of internal "customers"
and by benchmarking best practices, AAA has set measurable
34. Public choice theory has introduced the concept of government failure, which is
analogous to market failure. See BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 31, at 3-9, Charles
K. Rowley, Market "Failure" and Government "Failure", in THE ECONOMICS OF POLITICS
29, 31 (1978). In Florida, the governor recently issued a report that states without
equivocation that "government in America is failing." 1 GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION FOR
GOVERNMENT BY THE PEOPLE: A PRESCRIPTION FOR FLORIDA'S FUTURE 3 (1991).
35. The Oregon approach measures the performance of key programs, such as crime
control, taxes, and child care against the performance of other states. North Carolina has
created a private commission to do the same. See Rob Christensen, How Good Is Gov-
ernment? New Group to Set Standard, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, Jan. 21, 1974, at
1A. Although comparisons with other states are useful, the best benchmarks may lie
outside government altogether.
36. See DAVID E. OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: How
THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR (1992). David
Osborne was a speech writer for President Clinton during the campaign and is the editor
of the NPR Report.
37. The not-for-profit sector in the United States contains many huge companies and
is not often studied for the lessons it can offer government or vice versa. Research into
these companies could be very beneficial. In addition, large regulated entities like public
utilities are becoming increasingly competitive. See, e.g., Charles R. Moyer. The Impend-
ing Restructuring of the Electric Utility Industry: Cause and Consequences, BUS. ECON..
Oct. 1993, at 40 (discussing the effect of deregulation on electricity companies). The era
of cost-plus rulemaking, which insulated these companies from market forces, is over.
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goals for worker performance. In sum, there are plenty of models
for the federal government to employ in measuring its perfor-
mance.
3 8
Government is not the only entity seeking new models to
imitate. A fascinating development in the corporate world is the
borrowing of innovative ideas from unlikely sources, at the same
time that government and the not-for-profit sector are considering
market-driven approaches. Charles Handy has argued that corpora-
tions should borrow organizational principles from government and
become more "federalist" in nature. 9 He even argues that busi-
ness could benefit from the principle of separation of powers.'
Undoubtedly, successful corporations are decentralizing ("federaliz-
ing") to achieve economy and flexibility. IBM is the latest exam-
ple of a highly centralized organization splitting into smaller, light-
ly directed units." Given this trend, the much-maligned system of
federalism seems to be gaining new respect.42
The other reason that government cannot duplicate the suc-
cess of private sector reforms involves management and gover-
nance. Corporations are ultimately responsible to stockholders, as
government is to citizens, but they are managed and governed by
CEOs and boards who resemble the President and Congress only
slightly. The problem with government is that no one is really
held responsible for government performance. The Washington
game, at least when the branches are politically divided, is for
Congress to blame the executive and vice versa. On many occa-
sions, gridlock seems to be the considered policy option.
38. In fairness to the NPR, its goal is for the federal government to emulate innova-
tive companies. The NPR Report mentions putting customers first, empowering employ-
ees, and producing better government for less-goals that are shared by the private sec-
tor in the search for total quality management. NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, supra
note 6, at 6-7; see infra note 56 (discussing total quality management).
39. See Charles Handy, Balancing Corporate Power: A New Federalist Paper, HARV.
BUS. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1992, at 59, 59-61.
40. Handy suggests that management, monitoring, and governance-the corporate
equivalent of the executive, judicial, and legislative branches-should be unsegregated. Id.
at 67. One wonders if corporations truly want to replicate the counter-efficiency virtues
of the system of separated powers.
41. See Steve Lohr. LB.M. May Abandon its Hilltop Headquarters, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
13. 1994, at Al (outlining IBM's plan to decentralize and streamline management).
42. Alice Rivlin, President Clinton's Deputy Director of OMB, also has argued for a
revival of federalism. See ALICE M. RIVLIN, REVIVING THE AMERICAN DREAM 110-25
(1992).
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In an ideal world where the President manages and Congress
sets policy, the corporate analogy might work. As a practical mat-
ter, however, neither branch is willing to view its role in such
dichotomous terms, especially Congress, which not only sets policy
but wants to enforce it as well. For example, Congress often
makes statutory assignments to specific agencies, even some la-
belled "independent" of the executive, and then conducts exten-
sive oversight hearings. This kind of extreme micromanagement
would make most corporate boards blush.43 For its part, the .exec-
utive branch not only manages, but the President also pursues an
independent policy role, especially with regard to foreign affairs.
Given these political realities, it is probably pointless to push
the corporate governance analogy too far. It might work better
with a different constitutional framework.' Nevertheless, few
would argue with the proposition that if Congress could be moti-
vated to leave the execution of policy to the executive, govern-
ment would be more efficient. If Congress and the President
worked together to create a strategic plan for the government,
there might be some clear gains in productivity. Indeed, if the two
branches could plan together with a long-term view,4 5 these gains
might even change the nature of the relationship between the
branches.
43. See generally Sidney A. Shapiro, Political Oversight and the Deterioration of Reg-
ulatory Policy, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 4, 24-26 (1994) (viewing the oversight struggle be-
tween Congress and the President as a negative-sum game and documenting examples of
micromanagement by both branches).
44. The parliamentary system, for example, allows executive officials to be part of
the legislature and thereby places fewer formal restrictions on performance. Cabinet mem-
bers are part of the legislative process, and the civil service is a permanent bureaucracy
with more credibility than America's. See Thomas 0. Sargentich. The Limits of the Par-
liamentary Critique of the Separation of Powers, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 679 (1993)
(defending our system of separation of powers against challenges from the parliamentary
model). The same is true in France, where the Conseil d'Etat is the equivalent of an
administrative government. It runs the bureaucracy and draws its employees from the
most prestigious universities. In fact, the regulatory systems report refers to this organiza-
tion indirectly by accepting Judge Stephen Breyer's suggestion that a high-quality training
program for a "special group" of fast-track civil servants might be desirable. See IMPROV-
ING REGULATORY SYSTEMS. supra note 11. at 69; STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE
VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 64-81 (1993).
45. The NPR Report advocates a biennial budget process, which is a step in the
right direction. See NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, supra note 6, at 16-17.
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III. THE PROMISE OF THE GPRA
The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993
(GPRA),46 a remarkable piece of legislation, suggests that this
potential rapprochement of the branches is not just wild specula-
tion. It introduces the requirement of performance-based budget-
ing by expanding on an earlier act that sought to improve finan-
cial management activities within the federal government.47 The
GPRA is unusual both in how it emerged politically and in its
promise of radical reform at the level of strategic planning for
government agencies. It is one of the few congressional directives
in this realm that has the full support of OMB and the executive
branch.48 Its stated purposes are consistent with those of the
NPR.49 Among them is to "improve Federal program effective-
ness and public accountability by promoting a new focus on re-
sults, service quality, and customer satisfaction."5
The Act has two phases. First, it requires at least ten execu-
tive agencies to establish pilot programs in performance measure-
ment for the fiscal years 1994, 1995, and 1996."' Each year, the
agencies must prepare plans that set measurable performance goals
and then issue a report that compares actual performance with
these goals." Thereafter, subject to OMB providing Congress
46. Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285 (1993) (to be codified in scattered sections of
5 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., and 39 U.S.C.). For background on the history and purpose of the
Act, see S. REP. No. 58, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N.
327.
47. See Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990, 31 U.S.C. § 501 (Supp. IV 1992).
48. See S. REP. No. 58, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1993), reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. 327, 329 (statement of OMB Director Leon Panetta).
49. Although the Act reflects the goals set out in the NPR, it is not a product of
the White House. Indeed, its genesis seems to be in congressional frustration with agency
performance, in particular the Department of Housing and Urban Development scandal
of a few years ago involving the embezzlement of more than $5 million from the agency
between 1985 and 1988. See id. at 7, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 327, 333 '(remarks of
Florida Senator Bob Graham). In addition, the Government Accounting Office (GAO)
and the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) were strong supporters. Id.
at 3-5, 8-9, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 29-31, 334-35 (remarks of Comptroller
General Charles A. Bowsher and Richard A. Wegman of NAPA). The Act also was
supported by the conclusions of a 1992 GAO study. See GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OF-
FICE, PROGRAM PERFORMANCE MEASURES: FEDERAL AGENCY COLLECTION AND USE
OF PERFORMANCE DATA (1992).
50. GPRA § 2(b)(3), 107 Stat, at 285.
51. Id. § 1118, 107 Stat. at 290.
52. Id. § 1116, 107 Stat. at 288. The director of OMB has already issued a request
for agencies to participate in this exercise. See Memorandum from Leon E. Panetta to
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with a positive review of the programs, OMB would be required
to submit, beginning in fiscal year 1999, a Federal Government
Performance Plan as part of the annual budget . 3 The Act pro-
vides that during the pilot stage, and periodically thereafter, the
agencies could seek waivers of nonstatutory procedural require-
ments and controls in return for increased managerial flexibility.'
In subsequent years, agencies would be selected to engage in
performance budgeting.'5
The GPRA is a creative and pro-business approach to the
bureaucracy. It applies the principles of total quality manage-
ment, 6 which have guided business over the last decade, to gov-
ernment. To establish strategic plans and set performance goals
over a five-year period requires a sustained level of planning and
execution of which many think government is not capable. The
idea of Congress and the executive that performance budgeting
could work for the federal budget process as a whole is a radical
one. If it succeeds, the notion of government behaving like a
business organization will no longer be fanciful.
By establishing a five-year planning process, the Act contem-
plates that executive agencies will transcend the term of a single
presidency. It may be unrealistic to imagine that performance
budgeting can survive such political pressures. The Senate Report
seeks to meet this objection: "Even when a change in Administra-
tion brings about a shift in political philosophy, the program's
missions and long-term general goals remain largely intact. The
priorities and means of achieving those goals, and the approach to
problem solving, may vary significantly, but the long-term goals
usually remain the same. ' 7
Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (Oct. 8, 1993).
53. GPRA § 1105(a), 107 Stat. at 286. The GPRA also requires the U.S. Postal Ser-
vice to submit a strategic plan to Congress by 1997 and to establish goals and program
performance reports. Id. §§ 2802-2803, 107 Stat. at 292-93.
54. Id. § 9703, 107 Stat. at 289. Waivers of procedural requirements would allow for
compensation set above prescribed levels and even bonuses for performance. See id. §
9703(c).
55. GPRA § 1119, 107 Stat. at 291.
56. Total quality management is a process whereby quality is built-in, not inspected
for afterwards, and in which the needs of the customer dictate business decisions. Its cre-
ator and patron saint is the late W. Edwards Deming, who initially had more success
with the process in Japan than in the United States. See RAFAEL AGUAYO. DR.
DEMING: THE AMERICAN WHO TAUGHT THE JAPANESE ABOUT QUALITY (1990). See
generally Verkuil, supra note 7, at 13-14 (discussing how U.S. businesses woke up to
Deming's message).
57. S. REP. No. 58, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N.
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This statement certainly takes a benign view of the political
process. It seemingly ignores the political reality that Presidents
like to control the agencies, even in areas where Congress has
carved out a long-term interest. Moreover, political appointees of
a new President often have their performance measured precisely
by how well they can derail agency programs disfavored during
the campaign. Still, this is not an act passed by a naive Congress.
It was originally proposed during the Bush administration58 and
now has bipartisan congressional support. President Clinton has
assigned an enthusiastic OMB to implement it, and the NPR is an
endorsement of its message.5 1 It is possible that with such broad-
based support, the effective management of government can per-
manently turn the corner from theory to reality.0
It will take the full support of the bureaucracy for this trans-
formation to occur. There are statutory incentives in place to help
win bureaucratic acceptance. The first is the acknowledgement
that, as in the quality management of corporations, work must be
taken out of the process as well as put in so as not to exhaust
agency resources and personnel.6 Indeed, the very purpose of
strategic planning, goal setting, and performance results is to align
resources with mission. This news should hearten an often belea-
guered bureaucracy. A second inducement to obtaining agency co-
operation is the availability of managerial flexibility waivers that
would allow for the exercise of procedural discretion in shifting
resources to different projects within the agency to the extent that
improved substantive results are achieved.62 Results, not compli-
ance with rigid mandates, are the goal.
327, 341.
58. The GPRA originally was introduced by Senator Roth of Delaware on Oct. 3.
1990, as the Federal Program Performance Standards and Goals Act of 1990. Id. at 348.
59. David Osborne, who coauthored the NPR Report, also testified in favor of the
GPRA. Id. at 349.
60. Still to be resolved is what might be called the "oversight fight" between Con-
gress and the executive. If Congress can restrain itself and measure agency compliance
with the management goals contained in the GPRA, then change can occur; if agency
oversight remains an episodic and political publicity arena, it will continue to be business
as usual. See Shapiro. supra note 44, at 19-26 (discussing the negative consequences for
agency efficacy produced by the "oversight game").
61. The Senate Report similarly cautions against the "hollow government" phenome-
non, in which inadequate resources are allocated to expanding public missions. S. REP.
No. 58. 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 327, 342.
62. See id. at 343-44.
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Unfortunately, the Act does not go far enough. By exempting
matters of statutory compulsion from managerial flexibility waiv-
ers, it leaves in place many counterproductive regulatory restraints.
Perhaps agency proposals for statutory modifications could be
encouraged by a reform-minded Congress. Moreover, the Act does
not authorize the waiver of "statutory provisions or regulations
promulgated under the Administrative Procedure Act."63 By ac-
knowledging that the requirements of the Adminstrative Procedure
Act are beyond the agencies' managerial waiver power, we have
come full circle.
Notwithstanding these shortcomings, the creative initiatives on
rulemaking and procedural reform advocated by the regulatory
systems report, most of which do not require statutory change,'
are still quite relevant to the grander goals of the GPRA and the
NPR. The Act, supplemented by useful, if not dramatic, procedur-
al variations suggested in the regulatory systems report, is an
innovative scheme for rethinking government organization along
successful business lines. All in all, the NPR report and the regu-
latory systems report deserve support both in and out of govern-
ment.
IV. CONCLUSION
The regulatory systems report is a relatively unexceptional
part of a larger program for regulatory reform-the National Per-
formance Review-that does make bold proposals for change.
Even the NPR, though, pales in comparison to the potentially
radical reform possibilities of the Government Performance and
Results Act of 1993. This little-noticed legislative inducement to
change the management goals, incentives, and outcomes of federal
agencies bears careful watching and deserves full support.' In the
popular jargon of the corporate world, the GPRA intends no less
than to change the management "culture" of the federal govern-
ment. By becoming more entrepreneurial, creative, and flexible,
government agencies can become more "productive," a term that
must be quantified for government or business to succeed. The
63. Id. at 344.
64. See IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS. supra note 11, at 23-46.
65. Indeed. one of the future projects of this Journal's administrative law issue might
be to track agency compliance with the GPRA. A sustained, public review of its promise
and achievements can do much to ensure its success.
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question that titles this Comment remains unanswered, but at least
there is a framework in place for seeking the answer, which is a
qualified "no." Government can become efficient but not in the
same way that business can. Government efficiency requires a
political commitment that must be total and sustained. The NPR
provides a stage upon which this exercise can begin.
